災害復興22

災害復興21から続く

2012年4月16日、東京財団での「第1回日米欧・東京フォーラム」での発表資料です。
上が英語、下が日本語です。少し内容が違います。英文はうまく頭揃えができないので、お許しください。



QUICK RECOVERY FROM THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE

OKAMOTO Masakatsu
Director-general for Reconstruction Policy, Reconstruction Agency,
Government of Japan
April 16, 2012

 Tremendous progress has been made already during the past 12 months: tsunami debris cleared, basic infrastructure and industrial facilities almost restored. Although challenges remain, a clear framework for reconstruction is now in place and we are accelerating our efforts for executing reconstruction plans.


I. Damages and Rescue/Relief Operations in the Aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake (March 11, 2011)

The Earthquake was a compound disaster and the biggest earthquake and tsunami ever experienced in Japanese recorded history, a country of frequent temblors.

1. Damages

   (1) Human toll: almost all due to the tsunami
      16,000 dead, 3,000 missing, and 27,000 injured

   (2) Buildings: caused by both the earthquake and tsunami
      130,000 destroyed and 950,000 damaged

   (3) It damaged a number of parts factories in the region, disrupting the manufacture of key Japanese industries, such as automobiles and electronic devices nationwide

2. Rescue and Relief Activities
 
 (1) Emergency rescue operations
    Rescue operations were conducted by policemen and firefighters from around the country, Self-Defense Forces, Coast Guard, US military as well as other foreign military and rescue teams.

(2) Evacuees: Those living away from home
  March 2011: 470,000 evacuees
  March 2012: 340,000 evacuees
  (230,000 due to damaged homes and 110,000 due to the nuclear accident)

(3) Supporting the livelihood of disaster victims

     A. Providing housing
   19,000 public housing units provided, 68,000 private homes rented, and 49,000 temporary housing units built

     B. Supporting the lives of afflicted people
   Provision of information and supplies necessary for the livelihood of afflicted people;
   Provision of jobs for the unemployed people by local governments and non-profitable organizations with funding coming from the national government (approx. 30,000 gross jobs so far provided)

3. Some Factors behind the Success of Rescue and Relief Operations
 
  (1) Lessons learnt from the experiences in the 1995 Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake
    (NB: The government’s response in the aftermath of 1995 Earthquake was delayed due to a failure in quick assessment of damages in the disaster areas.)

  (2) Vigorous support activities made by both public and private sectors
     Unprecedented levels of assistance such as monetary donations, relief supplies and voluntary activities were provided by local prefectures and municipalities outside the disaster areas, private companies, non-profit organizations (NPOs), volunteers as well as individuals.

II. Current State of the Recovery (as of March 2012)

1. Basic Infrastructure and Industrial Facilities Almost Restored

  (1) Basic infrastructure (utilities such as electricity, gas and water supplies as well as traffic infrastructure such as roads, trains and port facilities.)
   Nearly 100% restored in all areas except uninhabitable areas, such as those washed away by the tsunami and the Fukushima evacuation zone

  (2) Public services (fixed-line and cellular phone network, postal service, hospitals, schools, banks, gasoline stations, and other public and private services)
   Nearly 100% restored in all areas except uninhabitable areas

  (3) Industrial activities

  A. Mining and manufacturing production
   Nearly fully recovered outside the disaster areas, and about 90% recovered in disaster-affected areas

  B. Agriculture and fisheries production
   36% of tsunami-damaged farmland recovered; 90% expected to be recovered by the fiscal year 2014.
   Almost all fishery ports now usable (with emergency rehabilitation works), and fish catch has recovered to around 70% of pre-disaster levels in disaster areas.

2. Factors behind the Rapid Recovery in Disaster Areas

  (1) Unprecedented government response:
   Establishment of organizations responsible for the recovery and reconstruction process, such as the Headquarters in charge of supporting the lives of disaster victims in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Reconstruction Agency
    (NB: In ordinary natural disasters, it is principally afflicted local governments, not the national government, that are accountable for the response to the disaster and in its aftermath.);
   Focus on restoring people’s lives and recovering industries in afflicted areas, not just rehabilitation of utilities and infrastructure;
   Securing of financial resources for the recovery and reconstruction process by raising national and local taxes.

  (2) All-out efforts of the private sector to rebuild damaged facilities and equipment, with a view to quickly restarting consumer services and production activities both within and beyond the afflicted areas;

  (3) Comparatively limited areas of serious damage
   Severe damage limited to coastal areas of the three Tohoku prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima.
   (NB: The three damaged prefectures collectively accounted only for approximately 5% of Japan’s population and industrial production.)
   Indeed, some municipalities’ buildings were washed away, but the function of the prefectural services maintained.
   There was relatively little damage in the capital of Tokyo, to the central government, and to the head offices of major private companies.

III. Challenges to Be Addressed

 1. All Disaster Areas (especially damaged by tsunami)
  
   (1) Full restoration of damaged infrastructure, such as traffic roads and seawalls
   Full infrastructure restoration plans have been already drafted and some projects have already started, others waiting for their implementation.

(2) Rebuilding of housings and landscapes resilient to future disasters
   Building housing in the heavily tsunami-affected areas would be dangerous. Residential areas must not be rebuilt in coastal areas and should be relocated to safer places. Afflicted municipalities are drafting their relocation plans reflecting preferences and interests of local residents. Some have already decided on, and implementation has been launched.

2. Fukushima Evacuation Zone

(1) The return home of people who were forced to evacuate due to the nuclear accident has sequentially started in designated low-contaminated areas of the Fukushima evacuation zone.
    To this end, the national government, in cooperation with Fukushima Prefecture and relevant municipalities, will address challenges such as decontamination, restoration of utilities and infrastructure necessary for public services, and restoration of employment with recovery of industrial activities.

(2) For people unable to return home right away due to the contamination of their home areas, the national government, in cooperation with Fukushima Prefecture and relevant municipalities, continues to support their livelihood.




      大震災からの急速な回復

T 大震災の被害と救助 (2011年3月11日発生)
 地震多発国の日本でも、過去最大規模の地震と津波であった。
1 被害
(1)人への被害:ほとんどが津波による被害
 死者数 16千人。行方不明者数 3千人。負傷者数 27千人。
(2)建物:地震と津波による被害
 全壊 13万戸。破損 95万戸。
(3)部品生産工場の被害によって、全国の自動車・電子機器などの製造に影響

2 救助と被災者支援
(1)救助活動
 全国からの消防と警察、自衛隊、海上保安庁、米軍による救助
(2)避難者数:自宅を離れて生活している人
 2011年3月 47万人
2012年3月 34万人 自宅が壊れた人 23万人
           原発事故による避難者 11万人
(3)避難者の生活を支援
@全員に住宅を提供済み
 公営住宅 19千戸。借り上げた民間住宅 68千戸。建設した仮設住宅 49千戸
A生活の支援
 暮らしに必要な情報、物資を提供している。
 失業中の人に対して、雇用を提供している。
 政府が資金を出し、地方自治体やNPOが仕事を提供。延べ3万人
3 救助と被災者支援がうまくいった要因
@阪神淡路大震災(1995年)の教訓
 政府による被災状況の把握が遅れ、対策が遅れたことへの反省
A 各セクターによる積極的な支援
 他の地方自治体、企業、NPOやボランティア、個人が、これまでにない支援を実施(お金、物資、人(労力)などを提供)


U 復旧の現状 (2012年3月)
1 インフラストラクチャーや産業は、ほぼ復旧済み
(1)インフラストラクチャー=電気、ガス、水道、道路、鉄道、港湾などの施設
 生活不能地域(津波によって町並みが流出した地域、原発事故による生活禁止区域)を除き、ほぼ100%復旧済み。
(2)サービス=通信(固定電話、携帯電話)、郵便、病院、学校、銀行、ガソリンスタンドなどの公共サービスと商業サービス
 生活不能地域を除き、ほぼ100%復旧済み。
(3)産業活動
@鉱工業生産
 被災地域以外では、ほぼ復旧。被災地域でも、9割まで復旧。
A農業漁業
 津波被害にあった農地のうち、36%が復旧済み。2014年度までに、9割を復旧させる予定。
 漁港は、ほぼすべてで、使用可能(応急の復旧工事による)。漁獲の水揚げ量は、7割まで回復。

2 急速な復旧を可能にした要因
(1)政府による、これまでにない対応
@政府に、責任を持つ組織(被災者生活支援本部、復興庁)を設置した。
 通常の災害は、地方自治体が責任を持っている。
Aインフラストラクチャーだけでなく、被災者の生活や産業の復旧を重視。
B増税をして、資金を確保。
(2)企業が、総力を挙げて、施設や設備を復旧し、消費者へのサービスや生産を再開した。
(3)被害地域が限られていた
@大きな被害は、東北地方の3県に集中していた。特に沿岸部で被害。
 3県は、人口や産業活動で、日本全体の約5%。
A市町村は、役場も津波に流されたが、県庁は残っていた。
 東京、中央政府、大企業の本社も、被害が少なかった。


V 今後の課題
1 地震と津波による被災地域では
(1)まだ復旧していない道路や堤防などの工事が必要。
 計画を策定済みで、それに基づき実施予定。
(2)住宅と町並みの復旧が必要。
 津波による被害地域は、元の場所に家を建てることは危険。別の場所に移転して、町並みを作る。現在、地方自治体が、住民と移転する計画を話し合い中。既に工事を決めた地区もある。

災害復興23へ続く
表紙へ戻る